“In the Brooklyn Unionist, Oct. 10 ^th , we find an account of a second trial of Miss Crandall before the Superior Court of Connecticut, Judge Daggett on the bench. The charge on which she was tried was for teaching colored people from other states. The Judge instructed the jury that free people of color are not citizens, and that the law of Connecticut is, therefore, not unconstitutional. The jury went out and after an absence of 20 or 30 minutes, returned with a verdict of guilty. A bill of exceptions was filed and the case put over to the Supreme Court of Errors, to be holden at Brooklyn next July.

On this singular decision we remark that if the case be so that free colored people are not citizens of the United States, their condition is far worse than we had supposed. But we cannot believe this, the arguments in the decision notwithstanding; and we cannot account for it that such a decision comes from Judge Daggett, except on the supposition that strong feeling, excited in his native place (New Haven), by an attempt to erect a similar school there some time ago, has biased his judgment.

Judge Daggett says

‘Are the colored inhabitants of this country citizens? It is the opinion of this court that they are not. Are slaves citizens of the U.S.? The constitution recognizes them only as the basis of representation and taxation. I refer to the definition of the word citizen as given by Mr. Webster, the ablest philologist of this or any country. (The judge here read the several definitions of the word as given in Webster’s dictionary, the last of which, and the only one applicable to the case is as follows—“In the United States, a person, native or naturalized, who has the privilege of exercising the elective franchise, and of purchasing and holding real estate.”) Slaves, then, are not citizens, in any of the state constitutions. Are Indians citizens? It is difficult to say what they are, but they are not citizens. Kent, in his commentaries, speaks of them as distinct tribes, living under the protection of the government,—2 Kent, 70. Are the free people of color citizens? I answer, No. They are not so styled in the Constitution of the United States, or, so far as I am aware, in the laws of Congress or of any of the states. In that clause of the constitution which fixes the basis of representation, there was an opportunity to have called them citizens if they were so considered. But that makes free persons (adding three fifths of all other persons,) the basis of representation and taxation.”

“They” (the free people of color) are not so styled (citizens) in the constitution of the United States.” What then? is it not implied? The constitution does not so style free white persons, but does it not imply as much? Again, “In that clause which fixes the basis of representation, there was an opportunity to have called them citizens if they were so considered.” And so there was an opportunity to have called free white people citizens. If the omission excludes the one from citizenship, why not the other “But that (the constitution) makes free persons (adding three fifths of all other persons) the basis of representation and taxation.” Now it seems to us that only two classes are here spoken of; first, free persons, who, absolutely, form a basis, and next, slaves, only three fifths of which form a basis. If then, the characteristic of forming a basis for representation and taxation, entire, without division (five fifths of a man and not three fifths) constitutes citizenship, by what logic is it inferred that free colored persons are not citizens? The constitution it is true says nothing about complexion, but does the omission therefore exclude free colored persons If so can any one tell why it does not exclude free white persons?

Judge Daggett says, “another reason for believing that people of color were not considered citizens is found in the fact that when the United States constitution was adopted, every state except Massachusetts, tolerated slavery.” We are dull—we do not see how this related to the point in question.

It was argued in the Court, that free blacks own vessels which participate in the peculiar privileges of American shipping, and that blacks may sue in the United States courts. This was overruled on the ground that those points had never been settled by judicial decisions. We suppose it is true that free colored people have owned vessels, and participated in the peculiar privileges of American shipping ever since the constitution was formed, that they have also had suits in the U.S. Courts, and that they have received protections as American Citizens from British impressment. And it seems incredible that this should have gone of 57 years, unquestioned, if they were not in reality American citizens.

What aid the definition of Webster gives to the decision we do not see. “In the United States (a citizen is) a person, native or naturalized, who has the privilege of exercising the elective franchise, and of purchasing and holding real estate.” Now in seven states the persons in question have the right of the elective franchise, and in all the right of purchasing and holding realestate. Does not the definition then make against the decision rather than for it?

In this decision also Judge Daggett has gone in the face of very high opinion. In the Convention of New York for amending the constitution, on the motion to insert the word white before the words “ male citizens,” in the article relating to the right of suffrage, Peter A. Jay said, “Is not the right of suffrage a privilege? Can you deny it to a citizen of Pennsylvania, who comes here and complies with your laws, merely because he is not six feet high, or because he is of a dark complexion?’ Chancellor Kent said.

“Suppose a negro owning a freehold, and entitled to vote in Vermont, removes to this state, can we constitutionally exclude him from the privilege of voting? The constitution of the United States provides that citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States.”

Rufus King said

‘Take the fact that a citizen of color entitled to all the privileges of a citizen, comes here—he purchases a freehold—can you deny him the rights of an elector incident to his freehold? He is entitled to vote because like any other citizen he is a freeholder, and ever freeholder your laws entitle to vote.’

And again,

“ As certainly as the children of any white men are citizen, so certainly the children of black men are citizens.”

Abram Van Vechten said,

‘There is another and to my mind an insuperable objection to the exclusion of free citizens of color from the right of suffrage, arising from the provision of the Constitution of the U.S. that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.’

In 1826 De Witt Clinton demanded of President Adams the release of ‘Gilbert Horton a free man of color and a citizen of this state’ (New York) unlawfully imprisoned in the District of Columbia, on the ground that he was ‘a free man and a citizen.’

We cannot believe with Judge Daggett that the whole free colored population of our country is outlawed, that emancipation confers as privilege but that of rambling about. And we hope there is a higher appeal yet than the Supreme Court of blinded Connecticut before which this case may be tried. We believe the people of Canterbury and their abettors are heaping up for themselves a load of odium, which they will find it difficult to bear.”