From the Brooklyn Unionist, October 10

MISS CRANDALL’S SECOND TRIAL.

Last Thursday Miss Crandall was brought before the Superior Court sitting in this place, (Judge Daggett on the bench,) upon an information similar to that on which she was tried at the last session of the County Court. She had been bound over to answer to two complaints, one for teaching, and the other for boarding colored persons from other states., but was tried on the former only. A.T. Judson, Esq. and C.F. Cleaveland, the State’s Attorney, conducted the prosecution, Henry Strong, Esq. and Hon. Calvin Goddard the defence. The plea as on the former trial was not guilty. Several witnesses were examined, the facts necessary to conviction were proved, and nothing remained but to establish the constitutionality of the law.

Mr. Judson opened the case for the prosecution and pursued much the same train of argument as on the former trial, except that in addition to the points then made, he contended that the clause in the constitution which was made the ground of the defence, was intended as a rule of action to the general government only, and not to the State Legislatures. He was followed by Mr. Strong, who, in a powerful, logical and conclusive argument, clearly exhibited the unconstitutionality of the law, showing that the Constitution was made to control the action of the state Legislatures; that it was intended to secure to all citizens of the United States, the enjoyment of such privileges and immunities as are fundamental; that the privilege of obtaining an education is fundamental; and that free blacks are citizens, and of course entitled, though citizens of other states, to the same privileges as our own colored population, and among others to that of acquiring knowledge here. Mr. Goddard closed for the defence, briefly but eloquently, and the State’s Attorney having concluded on the part of the prosecution, the judge rose and saying a few words respecting the importance of the question, and his inability to do it justice, declined giving his charge till the next morning.

On Friday morning as soon as the court was opened every seat was occupied and many persons stood unable to obtain seats, all listening with profound attention to the charge. It occupied as nearly as we could estimate, about an hour, and as will be seen by the outline given below was decidedly in favor of the constitutionality of the law.

After stating to the Jury the charge on which Miss Crandall was brought before them, His Honor Judge Daggett proceeded: “In relation to the facts there does not appear to be much controversy—it is your province however to decide whether they have been proved. It is also your province to decide as to the law, the court cannot direct you as to either. But it is the duty of the court to advise you in respect to the law.

It is claimed that the law under which this prosecution is instituted, is unconstitutional. If it be, it is because it violates the constitution of the United States, for it is not violation of the constitution of Connecticut. The question then is, Does this law violate the constitution of the United States? If a law is clearly unconstitutional, it is the duty of the humblest court in the land, even a justice of the peace, so to pronounce it, for all judges, under which name are included jurors when acting as judges, are bound by the constitution or laws in the respective states to the contrary notwithstanding.

In considering the question, “Is this law unconstitutional,” you will lay out of consideration all extrinsic matter, slavery, and all its enormous evils; the degradation of the blacks, and the utility and necessity of their being educated, except so far as it is necessary to determine whether the privilege of education is fundamental, of which I have no doubt.

There are two points to be considered.

1 ^st . The constitution secures to all citizens of the U.S. the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states. The construction of this section is not, as was contended at the bar, that it regulates only the action of the general Government: it is operative as well upon the state Legislature as upon Congress.

2 ^nd . Are the persons affected by this law, citizens of the United States. The law prohibits colored persons from Havana coming here, as well as the blacks of other states. With respect to the former, the right of exclusion is unquestionable, for they are not citizens of the United States. Are the colored inhabitants of this country citizens? It is the opinion of this court that they are not. Are slaves citizens of the United States? The constitution recognizes them only as the basis of representation and taxation. I refer to the definition of the word citizen as given by Mr. Webster, the ablest philologist of this or any country. (The judge here read the several definitions of the word as given in Webster’s dictionary, the last of which, and the only one applicable to the case is as follows—“In the United States, a person, native or naturalized, who has the privilege of exercising the elective franchise, and of purchasing and holding real estate.”) Slaves, then, are not citizens, in any of the state constitutions. Are Indians citizens? It is difficult to say what they are, but they are not citizens. Kent, in his commentaries, speaks of them as distinct tribes, living under the protection of the government,—2 Kent, 70. Are the free people of color citizens? I answer, No. They are not so styled in the Constitution of the United States, or, so far as I am aware, in the laws of Congress or of any of the states. In that clause of the constitution which fixes the basis of representation, there was an opportunity to have called them citizens if they were so considered. But that makes free persons (adding three fifths of all other persons,) the basis of representation and taxation..

It has been said that free blacks own vessels which participate in the peculiar privileges of American shipping. But this claim has never been settled by judicial decisions. I know of no case where this question has been settled. It is said also that blacks may sue in the U.S. Courts, but this too, has never, within my knowledge been decided. It is claimed that they are citizens because they may be guilty of treason, but so may any person who resides under the government and enjoys its protection, if he rises up against it.

[His honor then read from Kent’s commentaries II, 210 a note in which the commentator speaks of the degraded condition of the blacks and the disabilities under which they labor, and thence inferred that in Kent’s opinion they were not citizens.]

Another reason for believing that people of color were not considered citizens, is found in the fact that when the United States Constitution was adopted every state except Massachusetts, tolerated slavery. The slave laws of New-York were as severe as those of any state in the Union. In 1740 a slave in that state was convicted by three justices and jury of five, and burnt at the stake. God forbid that I should add to the degradation of this people, by stating these things, but such is our condition.

But if free blacks are citizens I am not prepared to say that the law is unconstitutional, though on this point I have more doubts than on the other. The constitution of the United States did not profess to vest in the State Legislatures any new powers, but to abridge those already possessed. I see not but the Legislature, under their general power, might pass this law, I say nothing of its justice or injustice, for I do not stand here to justify or abuse the legislature which passed it. If the people disapprove the law, let them choose better men to represent them who will repeal it. The privilege of acquiring an education is certainly a fundamental privilege, but I am of opinion that the Legislature may regulate it.

The jury went out, and after an absence of 20 or 30 minutes returned with a verdict of GUILTY.

A bill of exceptions was filed by the defendant’s council, and the case will be carried to the Supreme Court of Errors, which will sit here next July.”