FROM THE BROOKLYN UNIONIST, AUGUST 29.

TRIAL OF MISS PRUDENCE CRANDALL.

Windham County ss. County Court August term A.D. 1833.

            State of Connecticut

                        vs.                    information on the Statute, &c.

Prudence Crandall

Miss Crandall was originally brought before Rufus Adams, Esq. a Justice of the Peace for Windham County, by a warrant issued by him on a complaint by the Grand Juror of the town of Canterbury, charging her with violating a statute law of the State of Connecticut passed at the last session of the Legislature in regard to teaching, boarding, harboring, &c. persons of color, not inhabitants of the State. She entered a demurrer to the complaint, the Court judged the complaint sufficient and thereupon ordered Miss Crandall to give bond with surety in the sum of $150, for her appearance before the next County Court to be tried on said complaint, and abide the judgment of said Court thereon. Failing to procure bonds, she was committed to prison. The cause came on for trial before the County Court on Friday, August 23d: C.F. Cleaveland, Esq. the Attorney for the State, being absent from indisposition, the Court appointed Jonathan A. Welch, Esq. special attorney to conduct the prosecution. A.T. Judson and I. Bulkley, Esqrs. were associate counsel.  Hon. Calvin Goddard, Hon. W. W. Ellsworth and Henry Strong, Esq. appeared for the defence. The jury being empannelled and sworn, the counsel for the defence objected to one of the jurors from Canterbury on the ground that he had signed petitions, &c. in respect to Miss Crandall’s school, and taken active measures to put it down. The Court sustained the objection, and the juror was excused. They also objected to another of the jurors on the ground that he was a member of the Legislature which passed the law, was one of those who voted for it, and had, of course, formed an opinion with respect to its constitutionality. The Court decided that the juror was competent to sit. (He got excused, however, on account of sickness.) The information against Miss Crandall consisted of two counts. The first charged “that the said Prudence Crandall, on the 24 ^th day of June last, with force, and arms, in a certain school which before that time had been and then was set up in said Canterbury, for the instruction and teaching of colored persons, to wit: Theodosia De Grasse, Ann Peterson, Amelia Elizabeth Wilder, Ann Eliza Hammond, and others whose names are unknown, who at the time so taught and instructed were not inhabitants of any town in this state, which said acts were done, by the said Prudence Crandall, without the consent, in writing, first had and obtained of a majority of the civil authority and select men of the said town of Canterbury, within which said school was then instructed, against the peace of this state, and contrary to the form and effect of the statute in such case made and provided.”

The second count charged “that the defendant, with force and arms did wilfully and knowingly harbor and board, and aid and assist in harboring and boarding certain colored persons (named above,) who, when so harbored and boarded, were not inhabitants of any town in this State—without the consent in writing of the civil authority and select men, &c.”

Plea, Not Guilty.

The following witnesses were then called on the part of the prosecution.

Asahel Bacon said that he had called at Miss Crandall’s house in the month of June last, having heard that she had taken some scholars from abroad. Capt. Sanger accompanied him. They were both select men of the town. Miss Crandall invited them into her house very politely. They asked her in relation to her scholars. She said she had four who were from New York and one from Hartford.—She called them in and introduced them. Theodosia De Grass, Amelia Elizabeth Wildes, and Catherine Ann Weldon, he thinks were the names of those called. Witness did not remember the day of the month that he called—thinks it was the day after the girls came—certainly soon after.

Ebenezer Sanger coincided in the statement of Mr. Bacon.

George Cady had conversed with Miss Crandall—went to her house on Friday last to summon as witnesses to support this prosecution, some of the girls who were attending the school. One of those named in this subpoena said that she had been sent for him, on account of the sickness of her mother, and wished him to excuse her attendance at Court—told her that he could not, but would state the circumstances to the public prosecutor. Miss Crandall said that she did not see that there was any need of witnesses at all, for she should confess that she had broken the law.

Ann Peterson, This witness was a colored girl, said to be a pupil of Miss Crandall, and was one of those named in the information to whom Miss C. had given instruction. Mr. Ellsworth objected to the examination of the witness on the ground that she could not testify without implicating herself. Mr. Welch read the clause of the statute under which this prosecution was sustained, in which it was enacted that the pupils in a school kept contrary to the act, might be compelled to testify. Mr. Ellsworth said that he denied, altogether, the competency of the Legislature to compel a witness to testify, or answer questions that might implicate him, even to render himself liable in debt—otherwise a witness might be compelled to testify to what would charge him with the crime of murder. He alluded to the State Constitution and Bill of Rights which he claimed protected every person from criminating himself by being compelled to give testimony. It was contrary to fundamental principles. In this case the witness might make herself an aider and abettor, and subject herself to the penalties imposed by the statute. Mr. Judson claimed that the witness would not by her testimony implicate herself. The law was penal, and must be construed strictly. Even if she was aware that she was instructed by Miss Crandall, it would not charge herself with any crime. Mr. Judson read at length from Starkie on evidence, to show that the witness ought, on common law principles, to be examined, and was bound to answer questions as to what she knew of Miss C.’s school. At all events he claimed that, in this instance, such must be the case as the Legislature had expressly enacted that the pupils should be witnesses. Mr. Ellsworth, in reply, said he apprehended the question to be whether the Legislature possessed the power to compel a witness to convict himself. He read from the opinion of Chief Justice Hosmer, in the 8 ^th Con. Rep. and also from the case of the people vs. Mather, in 4 ^th Wendell’s Reps on the subject of examining witnesses.  By the principles decided these cases, which were the settled law of the land, he claimed that the witness was not compelled to answer any questions in relation to her knowledge of this school. The Court decided that the witness, under the circumstances, was not protected, but must be examined.—The examination was about to proceed, when Mr. Ellsworth rose and stated to the Court that the witness had been advised not to answer interrogatories in regard to her knowledge of this school. He felt it to be his duty now to repeat this advice. He wished the Court, however, distinctly to understand that the counsel for the accused had taken this course not with a view to embarrass the trial, but solely from a sense of duty. He conscientiously believed that the legal rights of the witness were such that she should not be compelled to testify. The Counsel for the prosecution, asked the witness when she came to Canterbury, but she declined answering the question. A number of other questions were then proposed to the witness, the principal of which were—“Has Miss Crandall kept a school for colored girls not inhabitants of this state?”—“Will you say whether the defendant has or has not instructed any person of color other than yourself since the 10 ^th of June last, or boarded and instructed colored persons not inhabitants of this state?” To all these and other questions of a similar character, the witness decline giving an answer, on the ground that she could not do so without criminating herself. The counsel for the prosecution then called Catherine Ann Weldon and Eliza Hammond, both girls of color, and charged with being pupils of Miss Crandall, and propounded to them the same questions as above; but they for the same reason, and by the advice of counsel, declined answering. The prosecuting Attorney reserved to himself, though he waived for the present, the right of moving for an order that these witnesses be committed for a contempt of court.

Jacob C. Gould said he was acquainted with Ann Eliza Hammond. She belonged to Providence R.I. had known her since she was a child—was the daughter of Thomas Hammond, who died in 1826. Her mother now lived in Providence—the father at his death was worth from 1500 to $2000 in real estate.

Levi Kneeland, Was not connected with Miss Crandall’s school except as an adviser in relation to it—was pastor of the Church to which Miss Crandall belonged—had seen several of the colored girls who were present at his church during the summer. In reply to a question whether he had seen one of the girls elsewhere than at his church declined answering. In reply to the question whether he had not seen one of them at Miss Crandall’s, declined answering—decline to answer whether he had advised Miss Crandall in relation to her school. Declined answering whether or not he had been in Miss Crandall’s school since the 10 ^th of June last. The court, having decided that he was bound to answer the questions put to him, and that the reasons he offered for refusing to do so, namely, that he might subject himself to a prosecution, and entangle himself in difficulties, were insufficient, granted a motion for a mittimus to commit him to prison and he was taken into custody by the Sheriff.

Eliza Parkis (a woman of color) was acquainted with Ann Eliza Hammond, one of the girls that Miss Crandall was charged with having instructed. Has seen her in Providence—has also seen her at Miss Crandall’s, and slept in a room with Miss De Grasse a colored girl from New York. Miss Crandall employed witness to work for her, because she said she did not wish to keep her scholars out of school to do the work. Never saw any of the girls in school.—Have seen them have books and study them.

Rowland Greene (affirmed) Has often heard that Miss Crandall kept a school for colored girls in Canterbury—has been at the house often, was called as a physician—went there and saw several colored girls—heard some of them recite in grammar, geography, &c. Some of the girls has been at his own house. Has seen a little girl there, said to be from New York—has heard Miss Crandall talk concerning her scholars from abroad—does not recollect to have heard her say that they were from New York.

Mr. Kneeland was not placed at the bar by the Sheriff at his request, and said he intended no disrespect to the Court by declining to answer the interrogatories put to him, and being advised that he should not implicate himself by doing so, he was ready to answer. He proceeded to state that he had visited Miss Crandall’s school twice. Once it was under the charge of another person. He had prayed in the school and conversed with the girls on religious subjects—does not remember faces as well as people in general—could not therefore positively identify any one of those present as being the ones seen at Miss Crandall’s—should think they were—his best belief on the subject would be a guess—has taken meals at Miss Crandall’s and eaten with her pupils—has heard them recite their lessons—thinks he has heard Miss Hammond spoken of either by the defendant or her sister. Miss Crandall has conversed with him in relation to her scholars—thinks she has told him that some of them were from New York, and some from Providence and New-Haven.

Albert Hinckley, has been at Miss Crandall’s several times since the month of June last—does not know whether he has been in her school room as he knows not in which room it is kept, has not conversed with her on the subject of the residence of her scholars—called on her as a friend and conversed on various topics—has heard that she kept a school for colored persons—has heard her speak of her scholars and school—has seen colored ladies at her house and has taken tea with them—cannot say whether any of those present were the ones or not.

Eliza Glasko, This witness was a colored girl belonging to the school but an inhabitant of this state. The same objection was made to examining her as was before made in respect to the others, but the objection was overruled by the Court. She however declined answering the questions propounded to her. The prosecuting attorney moved the court for a mittimus to commit the witness for contempt of court. The court granted the motion and ordered the clerk to make out a mittimus.

Hezekiah Crandall, (affirmed) His sister Prudence keeps a school at Canterbury for colored girls—knows Ann Eliza Hammond—could not certainly recognize any other that was present except perhaps Ann Peterson—has never been in the school nor heard the pupils recite—has seen Ann Eliza Hammond at his sisters, often, during June and July,—supposed she boarded there and was instructed by his sisters with others—knows by sight and name Amelia Wildes—does not know where she is now—has not heard his sister say any thing on the subject of her school for some time—she has resided in Canterbury some portion of the time for twelve years past.

James Chandler said he was at Miss Crandall’s several times last spring (not being able to say with certainty whether he had been there since the passage of the law he was not interrogated farther.)

George Roberts went to Miss Crandall’s about five months ag and carried a colored girl, Miss Hammond to the school—Miss Hammond it was said belonged to Providence, has been at Miss C’s since that time perhaps within ten weeks and drank tea—he then saw Miss Hammond but does not know whether she boarded there constantly or not—he heard her and other colored girls recite in Miss Crandall’s school—should think this was two or three months ago—has been at Miss C’s within a week but did not as he remembers see any of the girls present there at that time.

Mary Benson (affirmed) Has been at Miss Crandall’s school and found it very interesting—was never present but for a short time—‘tis for colored persons—saw Ann Eliza Hammond there—she is one of the scholars and boards with Miss C.—Witness recognized several of those present as among the number she had seen at Miss Crandall’s—one of the pupils, Ann Weldon was from New-York—Miss Hammond was from Providence—witness was at Miss Crandall’s five weeks since and took tea—several colored girls were at the table—does not know where any of them belonged except by report—visited the school when it was near closing and heard Miss C. give the girls instruction in Geography and Arithmetic. The prosecuting Attorney here rested his evidence, and the sheriff having served his process on Eliza Glasko was about committing her to prison, when Mr. Ellsworth interposed and stated to the court that rather than have the girl committed he should advise her to testify—again repeating that the course of the defendant’s counsel in relation to the testimony of these girls, was dictated by an imperious sense of professional duty.

Eliza Glasko the proceeded to give testimony. She said she was a member of Miss C’s school, and that the other girls near her were also members—one of them from Providence, the other said to be from New-York—the ordinary branches were taught them by Miss C.—reading, writing, grammar, geography, &c., witness begun to go on the first of April—the school was usually opened and closed with prayer—the scriptures were read and explained daily in the school—some portions were committed to memory by the pupils and considered a part of their education.

Mr. Judson then opened the case on the part of the prosecution.

He first stated the case and read the Act of the Legislature which he claimed that Miss Crandall had violated. He said that this act did not prevent any black from attending the district schools in the State, or any higher schools—that they had all the benefits of the school fund, and might attend the academies, high schools, or colleges, and that too whether they were citizens of this state, of other states, or of any part of the world. The sole intention and provision of the act was, that colored persons, from another jurisdiction, should not be intruded into any town in this state, without a written permission from the select men and civil authority of the town in which they proposed to reside. This was all, and this was perfectly lawful. The whole tenor and effect of the law was to place a school for colored persons under the care and supervision of the select men and civil authority of each town. He should ask the attention of the Court to the face that the Legislature had exercised a controlling power over schools within the limits of the state since 1717. (Mr. Judson here read from an old edition of the statutes, in respect to the power which the Legislature had exercised over schools in respect to preventing disorders and the application of the public money.)—These said Mr. Judson, were schools for the instruction of all classes, and the acts which he had read, showed that the Legislature thought proper to exercise care over these schools. Such was the ancient policy of the state, and this new law was no change of policy. The state owed its present honors, its present glories, to pursuing this policy of keepings its schools under a supervising power. Nor was there anything in the Constitution of the United States to prevent it. Towns, he claimed, had a right to say who should be allowed to become inhabitants by residence in their limits and this law gave them no more power than was necessary for the exercise of that right. That the law was illiberal and reflected disgrace on the State, on the Legislature which enacted it, he denied. On the contrary, said Mr. J., there are now more than 1500 schools in the state, supported by our fund of $1,800,000, to which blacks may go without the payment of a cent. Small as the state was, smaller than single counties in some other states, these facts were true concerning it. For himself he was proud of it. Where could a parallel be found in the universe?

Public policy, continued Mr. J., absolutely demands that a law of this description should be maintained. It was claimed to be unconstitutional because exclusive in its operation on a particular class. Other laws of the state were liable to the same objection. Physicians and lawyers were instances of the operation of our exclusive law. Tanners, Taverners, Surveyors, &c. must all be licensed. Manufactories were liable to be visited by the select men and civil authority for the purpose of seeing that the children employed in them were properly educated. If persons came here from other states and set up manufacturing establishments they were equally liable to be visited in this way though no such provisions existed in the laws of the states from whence they come. Lawyers in this state could not purchase choses [sic] in action. All these laws, with many similar ones, were passed in derogation of rights originally common to all; public policy however, required the enactment of them, as it did of the one in question, and in his opinion they all stood on similar grounds, and were, without question, in accordance with the Constitution.

Mr. J. next referred to the course which other states had pursued in legislating on the subject of the blacks. He remarked on the law of Ohio. Our law is not, said Mr. J., an act of exclusion, nor an act of prohibition. It does not pretend to send away those who belong here, nor does it prohibit any from coming, but only makes it necessary that permission be first obtained. The laws of Georgia and North Carolina went so far as to authorise the imprisonment of blacks who came within their limits, even though they came in the capacity of cooks and stewards of vessels. In Tennessee blacks could not come from other states and remain within the state above twelve days without incurring penalties. In Maryland a man could not manumit his slave without his leaving the state. Even in Pennsylvania, “the land of Penn,” no free negro could remain without giving bonds for his support. All these laws Mr. J. claimed to be obnoxious to equal and indeed to greater constitutional objections than the one in question. The article in the constitution of the United States with which this law was supposed to conflict, he understood to be, the 2d section of the 4 ^th article:—“The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.” Mr. J. claimed that the term “citizens” in this place, and throughout the constitution, had a technical signification—a legal meaning—that it did not include colored persons—that they were not be the constitution recognized as citizens. A certain class of colored persons, (slaves) were in it considered as property.

Mr. J. here referred to the laws of the United State on the subject of naturalization, reading from Ingersoll’s Digest, the several acts of Congress, and insisted that from them all, the language being precise, technical, and certain, none other than white persons could be naturalized citizens of the United States. He also read from the 2 ^nd Kent’s Com. 70, 71, 72, by which he further illustrated these views.

There have been, continued Mr. J., concurrent acts of the State of Connecticut which give the same construction to the constitution. If “citizen” do not mean a white person only—if it be claimed that a black is a citizen, then is the constitution of our own State a nullity, for it allows “free white males” alone to be electors. The privilege of being a freeman, he claimed, to be a higher one that the right of being educated. Why should a man be educated who could not be a freeman? A person who pays a single cent State tax, or who does military duty, is entitled to the privilege of voting. In Massachusetts these qualifications were not sufficient. Each state in the Union has these local laws and customs peculiar to itself—these must all be abrogated at a blow, by deciding the law in question to be unconstitutional. Full effect however, might be given to the clause in the constitution, referred to without producing this result, and that was, by construing the term “citizen” in the manner he had before pointed out.

The first act in our own statute would be nullified by a decision that this law was unconstitutional—a citizen of another State cannot maintain an action in our courts for any cause unless a substantial inhabitant of the State give bond for him. No one has doubted the constitutionality of this law, and the law in question, with respect to constitutionality, could not be distinguished from it.

Mr. J. said he should conclude his remarks on this subject by alluding merely to one other argument in support of this law, and that was, that the public safety of this State, the preservation of its true interests, required this law to be enforced. The southern States might emancipate their slaves and send them all to Connecticut instead of Liberia. The influx of that species of population might be so great as to be overwhelming. (Mr. J. proceeded to remark on the effect which recent measures of the British Parliament, on the subject of slavery, might have on this question, when he was interrupted by the court, who remarked that tho’ far from inclined to restrain all the limits of the discussion, yet it did not seem pertinent to the issue to argue the policy or expediency of the laws. Mr. J. said he would not press the point.) Mr. J. hoped that he had not been misunderstood in the remarks he had made. He wished not to oppress any class of population. He heartily wished that every slave might be emancipated that every day. But if it could not be done without destruction to our constitutions, and desolating our land, he could not desire it.

He would only add to the Jury that though it was true they were at liberty to consider what the court said to them on the subject of the law, as advice, still he hoped they would pay it such respect as advice from the bench was properly entitled to. A single word as to the facts. The information charged the defendant with boarding and instructing, in different counts. It was sufficient if they found her guilty on either. The day was immaterial. If they found her guilty of doing the act charged on any day, since the passage of the law, and before the filing of the information, ‘twas sufficient. It was not necessary that they should find that she had boarded or instructed each of the persons named in the information; to instruct or board one was a transgression of the law.

As to the proof it was abundant, conclusive.

Mr. Ellsworth, after stating the case, and remarking on the prohibitions of the law, said that he proposed not to occupy time in relation to the facts of the case. He would willingly have advised the pupils of Miss Crandall to have testified had he not believed that in so doing they voluntarily surrendered their most sacred rights. True it was, the defendant has kept this school—‘twas no secret, and whether that constituted a crime or not was for the jury to determine. In order to convict my client, said Mr. E., you gentlemen, must find on your oaths that she had committed a crime. You may find that she has violated an act of the State Legislature, but if you also find her protected by a higher power, it will be your duty to acquit. The court he was fully assured, would charge the jury that the law was unconstitutional, if they so believed, but after all, it belonged to the people to determine whether one of them had been guilty of a crime. Each one of the jury must be satisfied for himself alone, that a crime has been committed. He flattered himself that he should be able to lead them to the conclusion that the law in question was a violation of the constitution of this State and of the United States. The constitution of the United States was the highest power known in our land. Beyond that, no Legislature can go and if the jury find the law not to stand well with the constitution they must say so.

The real question for the jury to settle Mr. Ellsworth apprehended to be this: Can the Legislature of Connecticut pass a law prohibiting the citizens of other States from coming into this State, and there residing, to prosecute the acquisition of knowledge, in a way open to the citizens of this State. This he believed was the precise question, and it reached deep and wide—wider and deeper than was perhaps imagined. It was however claimed by his friend from Canterbury, that colored persons were not citizens, and that the provisions of the constitution, with respect to citizens of the United States, did not apply to this class of our population. The criterion of citizenship was complexion in the view of the gentleman who had preceded him. I, said Mr. E., make the criterion to be either birth or naturalization. Admitting that none but white persons can be naturalized, it does not touch the question of citizenship by birth. Is it so that a person born on our soil, is not a citizen of our soil? In the days of Revolution, said Mr. E., these men fought side by side with our fathers, and shed their blood for their country—the country to which they owed indefeasible allegiance. Their names were now inscribed on the Pension Rolls of the Government—they now received the honorable trophies of the services they had rendered. Where, said Mr. E., does the gentleman get the doctrine that the rights of man, as a citizen, depend upon his color? A colored man could appeal to the laws for the protection of his rights in every State could he, if he were not a citizen? (Mr. E. here read a few sentences from the commencement of the declaration of independence, which, he said, according to the argument of the gentleman opposed to him, ought to be changed so as to have the words “except black people” introduced between each clause,) Mr. E. said he was a republican, he claimed to be as much a republican as his friend from Canterbury, and he hoped that his friend was not so ashamed of his republicanism, as to wish this instrument, the Declaration of Independence, interpolated in this manner. Our own constitution, continued Mr. E., recognized, in express terms, equality of rights—that men were equal in rights, but to this the gentleman would add “except black men.” He hoped he should not live long enough to see such doctrine go forth from Connecticut. The free colored population has, and is justly entitled, to equal representation in the Congress of the United States with the white population. Could not a black man commit treason? The gentleman would have it that he could not, for none other than citizens can. (Mr. E. here read from the 2 ^nd Kent’s Com on the subject of citizenship, by birth.) I scout the idea, said Mr. E., that a man, born here by the side of me, is not a citizen because, his father was black, while I am a citizen because mine was white.

[The remainder of Mr. Ellsworth’s argument next week together with those of Messrs. Strong and Welch.]